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The following files were used as context for generating this wiki page: - [fingerprint.js](https://github.com/CurtisLu1/GeekezBrowser/blob/main/fingerprint.js) - [main.js](https://github.com/CurtisLu1/GeekezBrowser/blob/main/main.js) - [renderer.js](https://github.com/CurtisLu1/GeekezBrowser/blob/main/renderer.js) - [README.md](https://github.com/CurtisLu1/GeekezBrowser/blob/main/README.md) - [index.html](https://github.com/CurtisLu1/GeekezBrowser/blob/main/index.html) - [CHANGELOG_v1.2.3.md](https://github.com/CurtisLu1/GeekezBrowser/blob/main/CHANGELOG_v1.2.3.md)

# Fingerprint Isolation Overview The Fingerprint Isolation system is a core feature of GeekEZ Browser, designed to create unique and consistent browser environments for each profile. Its primary purpose is to prevent cross-profile tracking and bypass advanced anti-bot detection systems used by platforms like Cloudflare. This is achieved by randomizing key hardware and software attributes, and then injecting these spoofed values at runtime using a combination of Chromium launch arguments and a dedicated content script. The strategy focuses on "Native Consistency," which means it avoids easily detectable JavaScript hooks in favor of more robust methods. This includes generating a custom extension for each profile launch, which applies the fingerprint modifications in an isolated world (`MAIN`) at the very beginning of document creation (`document_start`). This ensures the fingerprint is stable and appears authentic to detection scripts. Sources: [README.md](), [main.js:103-112](), [fingerprint.js:102-109]() ## Architecture The fingerprinting architecture involves three main stages: Generation, Injection, and Management. The process begins when a user creates a new profile and culminates in a launched browser instance with a completely isolated and unique fingerprint. The following diagram illustrates the high-level data flow for fingerprint generation and application. ```mermaid flowchart TD subgraph UI (renderer.js) A[User clicks "+ New Profile"] --> B{Profile Creation Modal}; B -- Name, Proxy, Timezone --> C[ipcRenderer.invoke('save-profile')]; end subgraph Main Process (main.js) D[ipcMain.handle('save-profile')] --> E[generateFingerprint()]; E --> F{Create newProfile object}; F -- Contains fingerprint data --> G[Save to profiles.json]; end subgraph Browser Launch (main.js) H[User clicks "Launch"] --> I[ipcMain.handle('launch-profile')]; I --> J[Read profile from profiles.json]; J --> K[generateExtension(fingerprint)]; K --> L[getInjectScript(fingerprint)]; L --> M[Puppeteer launch w/ args & extension]; end subgraph Injected Browser M --> N[Browser starts with spoofed values]; N --> O["GeekEZ Guard" extension runs content.js]; O --> P[Fingerprint applied to JS environment]; end C --> D; G -.-> J; ``` This diagram shows the flow from user action in the UI to the main process handling fingerprint generation and storage, and finally to the browser launch sequence where the fingerprint is injected. Sources: [renderer.js:636-646](), [main.js:256-263, 350-455]() ## Fingerprint Generation When a new profile is created without a pre-existing fingerprint, the `generateFingerprint()` function is invoked to create a new set of unique identifiers. This function randomizes several key parameters to ensure each profile is distinct. Sources: [main.js:258](), [fingerprint.js:10-100]() ### Generated Parameters The following table details the parameters that are automatically generated for each new profile. | Parameter | Randomized Values | Description | |---|---|---| | **Hardware** | `hardwareConcurrency`: 4, 8, 12, or 16
`deviceMemory`: 4, 8, or 16 GB | Simulates different CPU core counts and RAM sizes. | | **Screen Resolution** | 1920x1080, 2560x1440, 1366x768, 1536x864, 1440x900 | A random resolution is selected from a predefined list. | | **Canvas Noise** | Small random integer values for R, G, B, A channels | Adds subtle noise to canvas rendering to create a unique hash. | | **Audio Noise** | A small random float value | Adds noise to the `AudioBuffer` to create a unique audio fingerprint. | | **Noise Seed** | A large random integer | Used as a seed for applying canvas noise consistently within a session. | | **User Agent** | Based on host OS (Win, Mac, Linux) and a fixed Chrome version | The User-Agent string is constructed to match the host operating system. | | **Timezone** | Defaults to `America/Los_Angeles` | Can be overridden by the user during profile creation or editing. | Sources: [fingerprint.js:4-7, 89-96](), [CHANGELOG_v1.2.3.md]() ### Fingerprint Object Structure The generated data is stored in a `fingerprint` object within the profile's entry in `profiles.json`. ```mermaid classDiagram class Profile { +string id +string name +string proxyStr +string[] tags +Fingerprint fingerprint +string preProxyOverride } class Fingerprint { +string userAgent +object userAgentMetadata +string platform +object screen +object window +object webgl +string[] languages +int hardwareConcurrency +int deviceMemory +object canvasNoise +float audioNoise +int noiseSeed +string timezone } Profile "1" -- "1" Fingerprint ``` This diagram shows the relationship between a `Profile` and its associated `Fingerprint` object. Sources: [main.js:259-262](), [fingerprint.js:78-98]() ## Fingerprint Injection The application of the fingerprint is a multi-step process that occurs when a profile is launched. It uses a combination of Puppeteer launch arguments and a dynamically generated browser extension. ### Launch Sequence The following sequence diagram details the interactions during a profile launch. ```mermaid sequenceDiagram participant UI as "Renderer (renderer.js)" participant Main as "Main Process (main.js)" participant Puppeteer as "Puppeteer" participant Browser as "Chrome Instance" participant Extension as "GeekEZ Guard (content.js)" UI->>Main: launchProfile(profileId) Main->>Main: Read profile & fingerprint from JSON Main->>Main: generateExtension(fingerprint) Note right of Main: Creates a temporary extension with a content script. Main->>Puppeteer: puppeteer.launch(args, executablePath) Note right of Puppeteer: Args include --proxy-server, --window-size, --lang, and --load-extension. Puppeteer->>Browser: Start Chrome process Browser-->>Extension: Load "GeekEZ Guard" Note over Browser, Extension: content.js runs at document_start in MAIN world. Extension->>Browser: Apply JS-based spoofs (Timezone, Canvas, Audio, WebRTC) Browser-->>Main: Browser instance created Main->>UI: send('profile-status', 'running') ``` This diagram shows that `main.js` first creates a custom extension and then launches the browser via Puppeteer, passing arguments for native settings and loading the extension to handle JavaScript-level modifications. Sources: [main.js:103-112, 350-455]() ### Injection Methods GeekEZ Browser uses two primary methods for fingerprint injection: 1. **Chromium Launch Arguments**: For native browser properties that can be set at startup. This is the preferred method as it's less detectable. - `--proxy-server`: Sets the network proxy. - `--window-size`: Sets the initial window dimensions. - `--lang`: Sets the `navigator.language`. - `--load-extension`: Loads the custom "GeekEZ Guard" extension and any user-added extensions. - `--force-webrtc-ip-handling-policy=disable_non_proxied_udp`: Prevents WebRTC IP leaks. Sources: [main.js:424-445]() 2. **Content Script Injection**: For properties that must be modified within the JavaScript environment of a web page. This is handled by a dynamically generated extension named "GeekEZ Guard". The script runs at `document_start` in the `MAIN` world to apply changes before any page scripts can execute. - **Timezone Spoofing**: Hooks `Intl.DateTimeFormat` and `Date.prototype.getTimezoneOffset` to report the profile's specified timezone. - **Canvas/Audio Noise**: Overrides `getImageData` and `getChannelData` to inject subtle, unique noise. - **WebRTC Protection**: Wraps the `RTCPeerConnection` constructor to enforce a `relay` policy, further preventing IP leaks. - **WebDriver Spoofing**: Sets `navigator.webdriver` to `false`. Sources: [main.js:103-112](), [fingerprint.js:102-205]() ## Spoofed Parameters Deep Dive ### Hardware and OS - **CPU & Memory**: Randomized values for `navigator.hardwareConcurrency` and `navigator.deviceMemory` are generated. These are applied via the injected content script. - **Platform**: The `navigator.platform` and User-Agent Client Hints (`navigator.userAgentData`) are set to match the host operating system (Windows, macOS, or Linux) to ensure consistency. Sources: [fingerprint.js:11-40, 90-91]() ### Graphics and Media - **Canvas**: The `CanvasRenderingContext2D.prototype.getImageData` method is patched. It adds a small, seeded random value to the alpha channel of specific pixels, which alters the resulting hash of the canvas image without creating visible artifacts. - **WebGL**: The WebGL vendor and renderer strings are currently hardcoded to `Google Inc. (NVIDIA)` and `ANGLE (NVIDIA)` respectively. - **AudioContext**: The `AudioBuffer.prototype.getChannelData` method is patched to add a very small random value to the audio buffer data, creating a unique audio fingerprint. Sources: [fingerprint.js:43-45, 160-184]() ### Timezone and Geolocation - **Timezone**: This is one of the most complex spoofs. The system hooks multiple `Date` and `Intl` methods to consistently report the timezone specified in the profile. This includes `Intl.DateTimeFormat`, `Date.prototype.getTimezoneOffset`, and `Date.prototype.toString`. The timezone can be set by the user in the profile creation/edit modal. - **Geolocation**: While not explicitly spoofed in `fingerprint.js`, the tight integration with a proxy server means that any geolocation checks based on IP address will reflect the proxy's location. Sources: [fingerprint.js:113-158](), [renderer.js:639, 701]() ### WebRTC WebRTC IP leakage is prevented through two layers of protection: 1. **Native Policy**: The `--force-webrtc-ip-handling-policy=disable_non_proxied_udp` launch argument provides a strong, native block. 2. **JS-Level Reinforcement**: The `RTCPeerConnection` constructor is patched to force the `iceTransportPolicy` to `relay`, ensuring that even if a connection is attempted, it cannot use local network candidates to reveal the real IP address. Sources: [main.js:434](), [fingerprint.js:186-194]() ## Conclusion The Fingerprint Isolation system in GeekEZ Browser is a sophisticated mechanism that combines native browser controls with carefully crafted JavaScript injections to create highly unique and isolated browsing environments. By focusing on "Native Consistency" and generating a wide range of randomized parameters—from hardware specs to canvas rendering—it effectively mitigates the risk of browser fingerprinting and provides a robust solution for multi-account management. The dynamic generation of a custom extension for each launch is a key architectural choice that enhances stealth and effectiveness. Sources: [README.md](), [main.js](), [fingerprint.js]()

Relevant source files